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Abstract: From a theoretical viewpoint, there can be market failures and organizational 
failures resulting in an underprovision of occupational health and safety. Works councils 
may help mitigate these failures. Using establishment data from Germany, our empirical 
analysis confirms that the incidence of a works council is significantly associated with an 
increased likelihood that the establishment provides more workplace health promotion 
than required by law. This result also holds in a recursive bivariate probit regression 
accounting for the possible endogeneity of works council incidence. Furthermore, 
analyzing potentially moderating factors such as collective bargaining coverage, industry, 
type of ownership, multi-establishment status and product market competition, we find a 
positive association between works councils and workplace health promotion for the 
various types of establishments examined. Finally, we go beyond the mere incidence of 
workplace health promotion and show that works councils are positively associated with 
a series of different measures of workplace health promotion. 
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The workplace is undergoing fundamental transformations posing important challenges 
for the health and safety of employees. Demographic developments involve changes in 
the composition of the workforce. Specifically, an ageing workforce requires that 
employers increasingly account for health issues. Moreover, the last decades have 
witnessed both an intensification of work and an upward trend in work-related health 
problems (Askenazy and Caroli 2010, Brenner et al. 2004, Cottini and Lucifora 2013, 
Green 2004, Green and McIntosh 2001). While the computerization of the workplace, the 
decline of manufacturing jobs, and the growth of service-oriented work have made 
traditional sources of adverse physical and environmental working conditions less 
relevant, they have increased the importance of psychosocial job stressors (Capelli et al. 
1997). 
 Work-related health problems involve considerable costs (Pouliakas and 
Theodossiou 2011). The World Health Organization and the World Bank attribute 3 
percent of lost life years to work-related health issues (Kreis and Bodeker 2004). 
Estimates by the International Labour Organization suggest that work-related diseases 
and accidents account for economic losses as high as 4 percent of world-wide GDP (ILO 
2003). Furthermore, social insurance expenditures on work-related diseases and accidents 
(e.g., statutory sick pay, disability allowances, industrial injuries disablement and 
incapacity benefits) account for roughly 2 to 3 percent of GDP in many advanced 
economies. This exceeds by far what is typically spent on unemployment benefits 
(Adema and Ladaique 2009). 
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 Against this background, it is crucial to understand the factors that induce 
employers to improve workplace health. Our study examines the role of works councils 
in workplace health promotion (WHP) for Germany. Works councils provide a highly 
developed mechanism for codetermination at the establishment level. They are a key 
institution of nonunion employee representation in many West European countries. 
Compared to their counterparts in most of the other countries, works councils in Germany 
have acquired quite extensive powers (Jenkins and Blyton 2008). 
 From a theoretical viewpoint, there exist a series of possible market failures 
resulting in an underprovision of WHP. Works councils may help mitigate these market 
failures resulting in an increased provision of WHP. Healthy working conditions have 
properties of a workplace public good. A works council is a collective voice institution 
that helps employer and employees to negotiate over the provision of that public good. 
The works council can also help reduce information asymmetries. It provides employees 
with better information about unhealthy working conditions and communicates worker 
preferences to the employer. This allows the employer to implement more effective WHP 
measures. Moreover, a works council may help overcome commitment problems of the 
employer. Employees may be not willing to make concessions if they fear that the 
employer does not undertake promised investments in improving workplace health. The 
works council can act as a contract enforcer by ensuring that the employer keeps the 
promises made. This allows to negotiate changes that otherwise cannot be implemented. 
Finally, codetermination rights increase the bargaining power of the workforce. Increased 
bargaining power allows the works council to push for a higher level of WHP and, hence, 
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to reduce the negative external effects of unhealthy working conditions on employees and 
society. 
 Works councils in Germany are mandatory but not automatic. Their creation 
depends on the initiative of the establishment’s workforce. Hence, works councils are not 
present in all eligible establishments. This allows us to conduct a within-country study by 
comparing establishments with and without a works council. Using the 2012 wave of the 
IAB Establishment Panel, our empirical analysis confirms that the incidence of a works 
council is associated with a higher likelihood that the establishment provides more WHP 
than required by law. This result holds even when controlling for a rich set of other 
factors influencing WHP. It also holds in a recursive bivariate probit model that accounts 
for potential endogeneity of works council incidence. Such endogeneity might result from 
unobserved factors influencing both the incidence of a works council and the use of 
WHP.  
 We also examine whether the relationship between works councils and WHP 
depends on circumstances and type of firm. Previous research on the productivity effects 
of works councils has shown that the functioning of establishment-level codetermination 
can depend on moderating factors (Jirjahn and Smith 2018a). However, usually only one 
single factor is considered whereby the moderating factor analyzed varies across studies. 
By contrast, in our study on WHP, we provide a more systematic analysis of moderating 
factors by performing separate estimates for a series of different types of establishments: 
establishments with and without collective bargaining status, establishments with and 
without alternative forms of worker representation, establishments in East and West 
Germany, foreign-owned and domestically owned establishments, establishments with 
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and without owner-managers, establishments in the manufacturing and in the service 
sector, establishments with and without shift work, establishment belonging and not 
belonging to multi-establishment firms, and establishments facing different degrees of 
product market competition. We find a positive relationship between works council 
incidence and WHP for almost every type of establishment. The relationship appears to 
be particularly strong in establishments with a foreign owner, establishments located in 
West Germany and establishments being part of a multi-establishment firm. 
 Finally, we go beyond the incidence of WHP and examine the role of works 
councils in a series of detailed WHP measures. We find that works councils impact two 
broad classes of WHP activities. On the one hand, our results show that works councils 
are positively associated with measures improving the information flow on work-related 
health issues. Establishments with a works council have a higher likelihood of using 
sickness absence analysis, health circles, and employee surveys about health issues. On 
the other hand, our results show that works councils are positively associated with direct 
measures to promote workplace health. This holds for measures undertaken within the 
establishment. Establishments with a works council have a higher likelihood of using in-
house activities (e.g., health checks and physiotherapy) and providing health-related 
training or advisory service (e.g. regarding mental problems or nutrition issues). It also 
holds for measures undertaken outside the establishment. Establishments with a works 
council are more likely to provide financial support to their employees for health 
promotion activities outside the establishment. Moreover, we find that works council 
incidence is positively associated with the establishment’s participation in cross-company 
networks on health promotion. 
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Economists have shown strong interest in German works councils. This is 
documented by a rapidly growing literature of econometric studies on the consequences 
of this institution (Jirjahn and Smith 2018a). The econometric studies have examined the 
influence of works councils on outcome variables such as wages, personnel turnover, job 
satisfaction, productivity, profitability, and innovation. Surprisingly, the influence of 
works councils on WHP has received very little attention. Thus, research on works 
councils and WHP has so far remained in its infancy. 
Hollederer and Wießner (2015) provide an exploratory study that is also based on 
the IAB Establishment Panel. Their analysis uses a sparse specification including a 
variable for works council incidence to examine the determinants of the provision of 
WHP. Hollederer and Wießner confirm that works councils are associated with a higher 
probability of WHP. However, they do not account for potential endogeneity of works 
council incidence and do not examine if the effects of works councils are heterogeneous. 
Moreover, Hollederer and Wießner do not distinguish between different measures of 
WHP. 
Furthermore, our analysis is related to a study by Askildsen et al. (2006). That 
study examines the relationship between works councils and environmental investments 
undertaken by establishments. To the extent environmental investments such as 
investments in purification technologies have a direct influence on the workplace, they 
can have immediate consequences for workplace health. Using data from manufacturing 
firms in the 1990s, Askildsen et al.’s study finds that works councils are positively 
associated with various types of environmental investment such as the introduction of 
environmentally-friendly production processes or down-the-line technologies. 
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On a broader scale, our study is also related to the literature on unions and 
workplace injuries in Britain and the United States (e.g., Boal 2009, Bryson 2016, 
Donado 2015, Fenn and Ashby 2004, Reilly et al. 1995, Weil 1999). That literature 
shows very mixed results on the role of unions in workplace injuries. Our study provides 
much more than just another data point from a different country. Industrial relations in 
Germany are characterized by a dual structure of employee representation with both 
unions and works councils. Works councils provide a highly developed mechanism for 
nonunion employee representation and, thus, have functions distinct from those of 
unions. Germany has a system of industrial relations sufficiently different to command 
attention of the scholars and policy makers interested in employee representation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The institutional framework 
is described in Section 2. Section 3 provides the theoretical background discussion. 
Section 4 presents the data and variables. In Section 5, we discuss the results from the 
empirical analysis. Section 6 offers our conclusions. 
 
2. Institutional Framework 
The dual structure of employee representation in Germany involves both works councils 
and unions (Keller and Kirsch 2015, Mueller-Jentsch 1995, Nienhüser 2014, Silva 2013). 
Collective bargaining agreements are usually negotiated between unions and employers’ 
associations on a broad industrial level. They regulate wage rates and general aspects of 
the employment contract. Establishments are covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement if they are members of an employers’ association. These associations function 
to coordinate member firms during negotiations with unions. The share of establishments 
covered by firm-level agreements is very small. 
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 Works councils provide a highly developed mechanism for establishment-level 
codetermination. Their rights are defined in the Works Constitution Act (WCA), which 
was introduced in 1952 and amended in 1972, 1989, and 2001. The WCA mandates that 
works councils be elected by the workforce of establishments with five or more 
employees. However, while works councils are mandatory, they are not automatic. Their 
creation depends on the initiative of the establishment’s workforce. To introduce a works 
council, a meeting of the workforce has to be initiated by at least three employees or by a 
union that has at least one member in the establishment. At this meeting, the electoral 
board is determined by a majority vote of those who are present. If the meeting fails to 
elect the electoral board or the meeting has been called for but not held, the labor court 
appoint a board upon petition. After being established, the electoral board calls the 
election of the members of the works council, implements the election and announces the 
results. The cost of the election as well as the cost of operating a works council is borne 
by the employer. 
 Works councils are institutionalized bodies of employee representation that have 
functions that are distinct from those of unions. They are designed to increase joint 
establishment surplus rather than to redistribute the surplus. The WCA does not allow 
wage negotiations. Works council and employer are obliged by law to cooperate “in a 
spirit of mutual trust . . . for the good of the employees and of the establishment.” The 
WCA stipulates that they shall collaborate with the serious attempt to reach an agreement 
and to set aside differences. If council and management fail to reach an agreement, they 
may appeal to an internal arbitration board or to the labor court. Works councils and 
employers are not allowed to engage in activities that interfere with the peace within the 
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establishment. Specifically, the works council does not have the right to strike and the 
employer is barred from obstructing the activities of the works council. 
 Works councils negotiate over a bundle of interrelated establishment policies. On 
some issues they have the right to information and consultation, on others a veto power 
over management initiatives, and on others the right to coequal participation in the design 
and implementation of policy. Their rights are strongest in social and personnel matters 
such as the introduction of new payment methods, the allocation of working hours and 
the introduction of technical devices designed to monitor employee performance.  
 Most importantly in our context, works councils have comprehensive rights in 
matters of health and safety. They not only have the right to full information and 
consultation on these matters and monitor that employers comply with the laws on 
occupational safety and accident prevention. They also have the right of codetermination 
regarding occupational health and safety. This means that decisions on occupational 
health and safety matters cannot go against a works council’s stated preferences. A works 
council can even conclude company agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen) with the 
employer on these matters. 
It is important to note that the behavior of employers and works councils is not 
completely specified and determined by the letter of the law (Jirjahn and Smith 2006). 
Thus, the functioning of codetermination cannot be immediately derived from a reading 
of legislation. In particular, a works council may use its codetermination rights on social 
and personnel matters to obtain employer concessions on issues where it has no legal 
powers. For example, the works council may engage in informal wage negotiations with 
the employer. If employer and works council fail to reach an agreement in these informal 
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negotiations, the council can threaten to hinder decisions in areas where its consent is 
necessary. Moreover, the cooperativeness of the employer can influence the functioning 
of codetermination. On the one hand, the employer may informally try to hinder the 
works council even though this is prohibited by law. On the other hand, the employer 
may choose to involve the works council even in issues that are not covered by the WCA. 
In the end, only empirical research can reveal the functioning of codetermination in 
practice. 
 
3. Theoretical Background 
Employers may to some extent voluntarily invest in WHP in order to reduce sickness 
absence or personnel turnover and, hence, to increase productivity. If employees prefer a 
higher level, they may pay for increased WHP through lower wages or higher effort. 
However, from a theoretical viewpoint, there are a series of possible market failures and 
organizational failures resulting in an underprovision of WHP. Worker representation has 
the potential to solve or at least mitigate these failures. As a consequence worker 
representation should be associated with increased investment in WHP. 
 
3.1 WHP as a Workplace Public Good 
If employees are willing to tradeoff wages for increased WHP, they could bargain with 
the employer over wages and improvements in workplace health. However, WHP may 
have to a larger extent properties of a workplace public good. Each worker may gain 
from improved working conditions, but this utility is not gained at the expense of any 
other worker’s ability to likewise consume this satisfaction, nor is it easy to exclude 
workers from the improved working conditions. This implies that there is a free-rider 
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problem making the individual-voice mechanism ineffective. That is, employees have 
little incentive to individually bargain with the employer over WHP (Askildsen et al. 
2006, Freeman 1976, Freeman and Medoff 1979, Vanek 1970, Weil 1999). While the 
individual employee bears the costs of monitoring WHP practices and enforcing changes 
in these practices, other employees gain from the individually negotiated improvements 
in working conditions. Therefore, a collective voice institution may in general be 
necessary to effectively bargain with the employer over WHP measures. A collective 
voice institution can also reduce transaction costs of firm-level bargaining and helps 
overcome coordination problems among workers. In Germany, works councils exert this 
collective voice role. 
 
3.2 Information Disadvantage of the Employees 
Information asymmetries are a further source of inefficiencies in the provision of WHP. 
Employees will only demand improvements in workplace health if they are aware of 
unhealthy working conditions. However, they may suffer from an informational 
disadvantage relative to the employer with respect to these working conditions (Pouliakas 
and Thoedossiou 2011). The free rider problem discussed above implies that employees 
have little incentive to individually gather information about unhealthy working 
conditions. Employees may also lack the expertise to judge to what extent certain 
working conditions affect their health. Moreover, the employer may be not willing to 
voluntarily reveal information about unhealthy working conditions if investment in 
improved working conditions is costly and there is only a low probability that employees 
will compensate her for this investment.  
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Employee representation can help overcome these difficulties. It offers a solution 
to the free rider problem and provides economies of scale in the acquisition and 
processing of information about unhealthy working conditions (Donado and Wälde 2012, 
Gegax et al. 1991, Nichols et al. 1995, Viscusi 1979, 1983). Moreover, the 
comprehensive information rights of works councils give employees better access to 
relevant information about working conditions in the establishment. A works council may 
even increase the willingness of the employer to reveal such information as it provides an 





3.3 Information Disadvantage of the Employer 
Not only information disadvantages on the employees’ side, but also information 
disadvantages on the employer’s side can result in a suboptimal provision of WHP. Even 
if the employer is interested in improving working conditions to reduce absenteeism or 
increase employee motivation, she may not be able to provide a suitable improvement if 
she lacks sufficient information about employees’ preferences. 
Employees who are not satisfied with the working conditions may ‘exit’ (i.e., 
quit). However, the employer does learn little from employees’ exit. Exit provides 
insufficient information on how the firm can improve its personnel policies. The 
employer may recognize that employees are dissatisfied and that this has negative 
consequences for retention while the reasons for this remain unclear. This is particularly 
salient when the preferences of employees who exit differ from the preferences of those 
who remain with the firm. More generally, Drèze (1976) and Drèze and Hagen (1978) 
show in a general equilibrium setting that it may be impossible for employees to express 
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their preferences via market mechanisms, operating through “hedonic wages”. A 
condition is that the number of preferences be greater than the number of working 
conditions. 
 Individual voice is also very likely to provide insufficient information about 
employees’ preferences. The workplace public goods problem discussed above implies 
that each single employee has to bear the costs of bargaining with the employer while 
fellow workers gain from improvements in working conditions. Each employee would 
have to collect data to support his or her views and incur costs of verifying any claims 
made by the employer. In this context, employees may also face the problem of employer 
sanctions (e.g., reduced career opportunities or outright dismissal) if expressing their 
preferences for WHP measures entails that the employer perceives them as excessive 
users or individuals with a poor health status.
2
 This reduces the incentive to exert 
individual voice. Moreover, transaction costs and coordination problems may prevent 
individual voice from being effective. Specifically, without coordination, it is difficult for 
an individual employee to know the extent to which his or her preferences are shared by 
other employees. Thus, a collective voice institution may be necessary to aggregate 
employee preferences and to communicate these preferences to the employer (Askildsen 
et al. 2006, Freeman 1976, Freeman and Medoff 1979, Heywood and Jirjahn 2009, Smith 
1993).  
 
3.4 The Employer’s Commitment Problem 
Commitment problems can also imply that the employer does not provide optimal 
working conditions (Askildsen et al. 2006, Heywood and Jirjahn 2009, Jirjahn 2009, 
Freeman and Lazear 1995, Kaufman and Levine 2000, Smith 1991). This is especially 
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likely if the employer bargains with each employee and transactions costs prevent the 
parties from writing an explicit contract for each worker. In this case, employees may 
anticipate the employer’s ex post opportunism. If employees made wage concessions, 
they may fear that the employer does not undertake the agreed investment in WHP. As a 
consequence, they are not willing to make such concessions and to bargain over better 
working conditions. Relatedly, if employees provided information about unhealthy 
working conditions, they may fear that the employer uses this information against their 
interests for a restructuring of work entailing job loss. Thus, they tend to refuse sharing 
their information with the employer. 
 A works council helps solve the employer’s commitment problem. The 
information rights of the works council allow employees to monitor the employer’s 
behavior and, hence, provide an opportunity to assess the employer’s credibility. 
Moreover, the codetermination rights of the works council protect the interests of the 
employees and help ensure that promises made about improved working conditions are 
kept. Thus, the works council can act as a contract enforcer allowing the employer to 
make promises that would otherwise not be believed. This increases employees’ 
willingness to make concessions to obtain better working conditions. 
 
3.5 Increased Bargaining Power of Employees 
Codetermination does not only provide a mechanism for negotiating work practices that 
otherwise cannot be implemented. It also increases employees’ bargaining power in those 
negotiations. A works council may not only use its codetermination rights in matters of 
occupational health and safety to improve working conditions. The council can also 
leverage its codetermination rights in other decision areas. The council can threaten to 
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withhold consent in another field covered by the WCA (e.g., overtime), in order to obtain 
employer concessions on WHP. The increased bargaining power allows the works 
council to push for a higher level of WHP. This may not simply mean a redistribution in 
favor of employees. It rather can imply an increase in social welfare as the negative 
external effects of unhealthy working conditions on employees and society are to a larger 
degree reduced. 
 
4. Data and Variables 
4.1 The Data Set 
We draw data from the IAB Establishment Panel of the Institute for Employment 
Research (Fischer et al. 2009). The IAB Establishment Panel is a representative sample 
of establishments (with at least one employee covered by social insurance) from all 
sectors in the German economy. The sample is stratified according to establishment size, 
industry and federal state. Note that we include variables for the stratification 
characteristics in the estimations so that we do not need to use weighted regressions 
(Winship and Radbill 1994). 
 The IAB is the research institute of the German Federal Employment Agency. 
The institute contracts with Infratest Sozialforschung, a professional survey and opinion 
research institute, to conduct the interviews. The data are collected on the basis of a 
questionnaire and follow-up personal interviews with the owner or top manager of the 
establishment.
3
 Each year since 1993 (1996), the IAB Establishment Panel has surveyed 
several thousand establishments in Western (Eastern) Germany. Basic information on the 
establishment and a core set of questions are asked annually. Additional topics are 
introduced in specific waves. 
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 For our analysis we use the 2012 wave of the IAB Establishment Panel. This 
wave provides detailed information on various measures of WHP. We exclude non-profit 
organizations and the public sector. Furthermore, as the WCA only applies to 
establishments with at least five employees, the analysis is restricted to establishments 
that meet this minimum size. 
 
4.2 Dependent Variables 
The survey asks: ‘Do you use or financially support WHP measures which go beyond the 
provisions stipulated by law?’ The survey lists a series of detailed items. Each of these 
items can be answered with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. The items and their descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 1. Sickness absence analysis, employee surveys about health issues at the 
workplace, and health circles are measures to gain systematic information about health-
related problems within the establishment and to find solutions to these problems. In-
house activities (e.g., health checks or physiotherapy), and health-related training and 
advisory service for employees (e.g. concerning mental problems or nutrition) refer to 
concrete measures improving employees’ health. The survey provides also information 
on whether or not the employer provides financial support to employees for health 
promotion activities outside the establishment or participates in a cross-company network 
on health promotion (e.g., a network organized by a health insurance company). Finally 
there is an item ‘other measures’. 
 In our empirical analysis, we use a general dummy for WHP. This dummy equals 
1 if the establishment uses at least one of the measures. 52 percent of the establishments 
use at least one of the health promotion measures listed in the table. Additionally, we use 
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specific dummy variables for the each health promotion measure listed in the table. A 
dummy is equal to 1 if the establishment uses the respective health promotion measure. 
 
4.3 Key Explanatory Variable 
The definitions and descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are shown in Table 
2. Our key explanatory variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a works council is present in the 
establishment. As discussed in Section 2, the creation of a works council depends on the 
initiative of the establishment’s workforce. Thus, works councils are not present in all 
eligible establishments so we can compare establishments with and without a works 
council. As suggested by our theoretical background discussion works council should 
have a positive influence on WHP by facilitating the provision of workplace public 
goods, solving commitment problems of the employer, improving the information sharing 
between employer and employees and giving employees more bargaining power. 
 
4.4 Control Variables 
The data set provides a rich set of control variables. Thus, we can account for a variety of 
factors that potentially also have an influence on WHP. In order to isolate the role of 
works councils from other industrial relations factors, we include variables for the 
coverage by a collective bargaining agreement and for the use of alternative forms of 
employee representation. Collective bargaining agreements not only regulate wage rates, 
but also general working conditions. To the extent this also involves WHP, 
establishments covered by collective bargaining should have a higher likelihood of 
engaging in WHP. 
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Alternative forms of employee representation such as staff spokesmen and round 
tables are voluntarily implemented by the employer. Similar to works councils, they 
provide channels for improved communication and information sharing between 
management and workers. However, they have no legally defined rights and are far less 
powerful than works councils. Thus, from a theoretical viewpoint, it is an open question 
if these alternative forms of employee representation can play a role similar to that of 
works councils. 
 Employers may to some extent invest in WHP with or without employee 
representation in order to reduce sickness absence and to improve productivity. The costs 
and benefits of this investment can depend on series of circumstances. The structure of 
the workforce may be one factor influencing the tradeoff between the costs and benefits 
of WHP. In our examination, a series of variables capture the structure of the workforce. 
The qualification of the workforce is captured by the share of skilled employees and the 
share of employees with a university degree. If skilled and highly skilled workers are not 
fit for work, they will not yield a competitive advantage for the establishment. Thus, 
employers with a skilled or highly skilled workforce should have an increased incentive 
to invest in the employees’ health (Nunez and Prieto 2018). We also include the share of 
apprentices. Employers often retain apprentices after they have completed their training 
so young people use the apprenticeship to enter internal labor markets. (Heywood and 
Jirjahn 2016). Internal labor markets bind employees and firms and may make it 
particularly profitable to invest in employees’ long-term health. 
 Furthermore, we account for the share of blue-collar workers. Blue-collar workers 
are directly involved in production and, hence, are exposed to working conditions such as 
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noise, vibrations, dangerous machines, and chemical and organic substances that entail 
increased health risks. Employers may invest in WHP to reduce the resulting sickness 
absence and, hence, disruptions in production. 
Variables for the share of females, part-timers and temporary agency employees 
are also included. The influence of these variables is ambiguous from a theoretical point 
of view. On the one hand, they indicate employees with a lower labor force attachment or 
shorter employment horizon reducing the employer’s incentive to invest in the health of 
these employees. On the other hand, they indicate a high share of peripheral employees 
ensuring stable employment of primary employees (Heywood and Jirjahn 2009). A stable 
core workforce increases the employer’s willingness to promote workplace health. 
 Working time issues are captured by the usual weekly hours of full-time 
employees, flexible working time arrangements, and shift work and Sunday work. There 
have been concerns that longer working hours entail excessive work contributing to 
health problems such as irregular heartbeat and, hence, an increased risk of stroke 
(Kivimäki et al. 2017). Shift work and Sunday work reflect working at unusual times. 
Specifically, shift work has been shown to cause troublesome health problems such as 
stress, anxiety, sleeping problems and irritability (Cottini and Lucifora 2013, Finn 1981). 
Thus, employers using shift work may invest in WHP in order to reduce these problems. 
Flexible working time arrangement involve two opposing influences. On the one hand, to 
the extent employees can decide about their starting and finishing times, flexible working 
time arrangements may contribute to improved work-life balance reducing the need to 
invest in WHP. On the other hand, these arrangements can involve increased stress and 
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health problems if the employer varies starting and finishing times to adjust production to 
market fluctuations. 
 The nature of production is accounted for by three dummies for the vintage of 
production technology and a dummy for innovative activities. Technological change 
appears to entail an intensification of work as new technologies such as information and 
communication technologies afford greater facility to management to monitor the pace of 
work and to determine workflows (Green 2004). Moreover, technological change and 
innovativeness are accompanied by a reorganization of work toward greater flexibility 
and multitasking (Campaner et al. 2018, Jirjahn and Mohrenweiser 2019). The 
reorganization of work additionally contributes to the intensification of work involving 
an increase in mental health problems (Askenazy and Caroli 2010, Brenner et al. 2004, 
Cottini and Lucifora 2013). Altogether, this suggests that innovativeness and a 
technology of a more recent vintage should be associated with an increased incentive to 
invest in WHP. 
 Moreover, we account for the managerial environment by including variables for 
dominant foreign owners and the presence of owner-managers. Employees in foreign-
owned firms appear to perceive higher job insecurity than employees in domestically 
owned firms (Dill and Jirjahn 2016, Scheve and Slaughter 2004). Foreign owners may 
contribute to higher job insecurity as they implement new production processes and 
management practices in the firm and can more easily shift production to facilities in 
other countries. The basic point is that perceived job loss fears affect mental health 
(Burchell 1994). Thus, foreign-owned establishments may have a higher need for 
investing in WHP than their domestically owned counterparts. 
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 Owner-managers typically have more personal and informal relationships with 
their employees. These relationships are often considered by both the owner-manager and 
the employees as ‘like being one big family’ (Limborg et al. 2003). The implications for 
WHP are ambiguous. On the one hand, paternalistic owner-managers may specifically 
take care of the health of the employees. On the other hand, employees in owner-
managed firms tend to abstain from open criticism (Marlow 2002). This may imply that 
the owner-manager has less information about employees’ preferences and views health 
issues as being the responsibility of the employees (Hasle et al. 2011). 
 The legal form of the establishment can also play a role. German law 
distinguishes between two types of legal forms, namely non-corporate and corporate 
establishments. Owners of non-corporate firms are fully liable with their entire personal 
assets whereas owners of corporate firms are only liable up to their individual shares. 
Owners are more willing to support risky projects if they are protected by limited 
liability. Thus, to the extent the returns of the investments in WHP are uncertain, these 
investments are more likely to be undertaken by corporate establishments. The legal form 
of the establishment is controlled for by a dummy equal to 1 if the establishment is a 
private limited company or stock corporation. 
 Moreover, we control for the competitive pressure establishments are facing at 
their product markets. Building from the literature on competition and innovation 
(Aghion et al. 2005), one may expect that product market competition involves two 
opposing influences investments in WHP. On the one hand, product market competition 
can increase the firm’s incentive to undertake such investments to increase its 
competitiveness. On the other hand, there can be a discouragement effect if high 
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competition implies that firms will not succeed even when they undertake the 
investments. 
 We also control for establishment size and multi-establishment status. 
Establishment size should be positively associated with WHP. Implementing WHP may 
involve a fixed cost, and the fixed cost per employee diminishes with the number of 
employee receiving WHP. This in turn increases the net benefit of WHP. Similarly, the 
incentive to invest in WHP should be higher if the fixed cost can be spread across the 
establishments of a multi-establishment firm. Finally, we also control for industry and 




5.1 Basic Estimations 
Table 3 shows the basic estimations. The determinants of providing more WHP than 
required by law are estimated by using the probit procedure. Column (1) shows the initial 
regression results. A series of control variables take significant coefficients. Larger 
establishments and establishments that are limited liability companies or stock 
corporations are more likely to provide WHP. Single-site establishments are less likely to 
provide WHP. Ownership also plays a role. The presence of an owner-manager emerges 
as a negative determinant of WHP. Turning to the variables for the structure of the 
workforce, the shares of apprentices, blue-collar workers and temporary agency workers 
are positively associated with WHP. The results on technology and innovativeness also 
conform to expectations. Innovative establishments and establishments with a production 
technology of a more recent vintage are more likely to provide WHP. Furthermore, 
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working time arrangements have an influence. Shift work and flexible working time 
arrangements are positive determinants of WHP while Sunday work is a negative 
determinant. 
 Most salient to our topic, the incidence of a works council is positively associated 
with the provision of WHP. This conforms to the theoretical expectation that works 
councils help mitigate market and organizational failures in the provision of workplace 
health. The positive association is not only statistically significant, but also economically 
meaningful. Establishments with a works council have a 9.4 percentage point higher 
probability of providing more WHP than required by law. Given that the mean of the 
WHP variable equals 52.3 percent, this implies an increase in the probability of WHP 
provision of 18 percent. 
 However, not only the works council variable, but also the variable capturing 
other types of employee representation emerges as a significantly positive determinants 
of WHP. Alternative forms of nonunion employee representation voluntarily 
implemented by the employer have a slightly stronger influence than works councils. The 
use of alternative forms of employee representation is associated with an 11.1 percentage 
point higher likelihood that the establishment provides WHP. Union employee 
representation is captured by the variable for collective bargaining coverage. The 
influence of this type of employee representation is smaller than the influence of a works 
council. Collective bargaining coverage is associated with a 2.8 percentage point higher 
probability of providing WHP. The finding that also other types of employee 
representation are significant determinants of WHP gives rise to the question of whether 
the influence of these types is simply additive to that of works councils or whether 
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collective bargaining coverage and alternative employee representation are 
complementary or substitutive to works councils. We will address this question when 
examining if the relationship between works councils and WHP depends on 
circumstances and type of establishment. 
While the positive link between works councils and WHP is consistent with the 
notion that employee representation helps mitigate market and organizational failures in 
the provision of workplace health, there may be an alternative interpretation of this link. 
The link might simply reflect an income effect. A series of studies have shown that the 
wage level is higher in establishments with a works council (see Jirjahn 2017 for a 
survey). Thus, if workplace health is a normal good, the influence of works councils on 
WHP might reflect the higher wage level associated with works council incidence. In 
order to test this alternative explanation, we include the wage per employee in regression 
(2). The wage variable takes a significantly positive coefficient. This conforms to the 
notion that employees earning higher wages demand more workplace health. However 
most importantly, including the wage variable does not change our key result. Works 
council incidence remains a significant determinant of WHP and the estimated influence 
is similar to that obtained by regression (1). Thus, we do not find evidence that the link 
between works councils and WHP is driven by an income effect. In what follows we do 
no longer include the wage variable in the regressions as it has a larger number of 
missing values reducing the number of observations. 
We recognize that works council incidence is correlated with establishment size 
(e.g., Jirjahn and Smith 2006). Very small establishments usually do not have a works 
council while works councils are present in almost all large establishments. Hence 
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following previous studies on works councils, we check the robustness of results by 
excluding small and large establishments from the analysis. In regression (3), we provide 
an estimation for medium sized establishments with between 21 to 100 employees. In 
regression (4), the estimation sample is restricted to establishments with between 21 and 
300 employees. Both estimations confirm our key finding. The works council variable 
takes a significantly positive coefficient and the magnitude of the estimated influence is 
similar to that obtained for the full estimation sample.  
 
5.2 Moderating Factors 
A series of previous studies have shown that the consequences of works councils can 
depend on circumstances and type of establishment. This gives rise to the question of 
whether the link between works councils and WHP only holds for specific types of 
establishments or can be considered as rather general. Thus, in what follows, we examine 
whether moderating factors play a role in the relationship between works councils and 
WHP. Table 4 provides the results on our key explanatory variable. In order to save 
space, we suppress the results on the control variables.
4
 
 Previous research suggests that works councils have a stronger influence on 
innovativeness, productivity and profitability if establishments are covered by collective 
bargaining agreements (Huebler and Jirjahn 2003, Jirjahn 2017). These findings fit the 
hypothesis that, in covered establishments, works councils are less involved in 
distributional issues and have a stronger focus on performance-enhancing activities. 
Against this background, we run separate regressions for covered and uncovered 
establishments. The estimates show a positive influence of works councils on WHP for 
both types of establishments with the influence being slightly stronger in covered than in 
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uncovered establishments. However, the difference in the estimated coefficients is not 
statistically significant. 
 Our initial estimations have shown that not only works councils, but also 
alternative forms of nonunion employee representation voluntarily implemented by 
employers are positively associated with WHP. This gives rise to the question of whether 
these alternative forms of nonunion representation are substitutes to mandated works 
councils. In order to answer this question we perform separate estimations for 
establishments with and without such alternative forms. The estimations show a positive 
influence of works councils on WHP for both types of establishments. Interestingly, the 
positive influence is about twice as large in establishments with the alternative forms of 
nonunion representation. This suggests that the relationship between alternative forms of 
nonunion representation and works councils is not substitutive, but quite the contrary 
complementary. However, the difference in these estimated coefficients is not statistically 
significant. Thus, we have to conclude that the influences of works councils and 
alternative forms of nonunion representation appear to be additive. Altogether, the basic 
point is that our estimates provide no evidence of a substitutive relationship.  
 The functioning of works councils can depend on whether the establishment is a 
single-establishment firm or belongs to a multi-establishment firm (Jirjahn 2011). In 
multi-establishment firms there is a network of works councils coordinated by a central 
council (Gesamtbetriebsrat) that is composed of delegates from the establishment-level 
works councils. Thus, the power of an establishment’s works council to influence 
decisions is likely to be stronger if the establishment belongs to a multi-establishment 
firm. This implies that the link between works councils and WHP should be stronger in 
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establishments belonging to a multi-establishment firm. Our estimations conform to this 
expectation. We find a positive influence of works councils on WHP for both single-
establishment firms and establishments belonging to a multi-establishment firm with the 
influence being significantly stronger in the latter type of establishment. 
 Previous research indicates that works councils are less likely to play a trust-
building and performance-enhancing role in foreign-owned than in domestically owned 
establishments (Dill and Jirjahn 2017, Heywood and Jirjahn 2014, Jirjahn and Mueller 
2014). Against this background one might expect that the link between works councils 
and WHP should also be weaker in foreign-owned establishments. Our results do not 
conform to this expectation. While we find a positive link between works councils and 
WHP for both establishments with foreign owners and establishments with domestic 
owners, the link is significantly stronger in foreign-owned establishments. One 
explanation for this finding could be that employees in foreign-owned establishments 
experience more stressful working conditions including higher perceived job insecurity 
(Dill and Jirjahn 2016). Thus, works councils in foreign-owned establishments may 
specialize to a larger extent in activities that improve workplace health. 
 Owner-managers might play a moderating role, too. Owner-managers appear to 
be more likely to oppose works councils than hired managers (Jirjahn and Mohrenweiser 
2016). This might suggest that works councils might be less effective in promoting 
workplace health when an owner-manager is present. However, the estimates show no 
significant difference in the influence of works councils between establishments with 
owner-managers and establishments with hired managers. 
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 Furthermore, we provide separate estimates for establishments with and without 
shift work. Shift work causes troublesome problems for health and on-the-job safety of 
employees. Works councils can help design shift work schedules that take health issues to 
a larger degree into account (Jirjahn 2008). Against this background, we examine 
whether works councils play a specific role in WHP if establishments use shift work. The 
separate estimates confirm a positive link between works councils and WHP for 
establishments with and without shift work. They do not indicate that the role of works 
councils significantly differs between these types of establishments. 
 Industry and region may also play a moderating role in the functioning of works 
councils (Frick and Moeller 2003). To examine the role of industry we focus on the 
manufacturing and the service sector and run separate regressions for the two sectors. The 
separate regressions confirm a positive link between works councils and WHP for both 
the manufacturing and the service sector and show no significant difference between the 
two sectors. 
 To account for regional differences, we provide separate estimations for 
establishments in West and East Germany. While these estimations show a positive 
influence of works councils on WHP for both parts of Germany, the influence is 
significantly stronger in West Germany. This finding conforms to the notion that 
workplace partners in West and East Germany do not have the same history so that the 
functioning of industrial relations to some degree still differs between the two parts of the 
country (Hyman 1996). 
 Finally, we examine whether product market competition plays a moderating role 
to take into account that the economic situation of the establishment can influence the 
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functioning of works councils (Jirjahn 2009). With the exception of establishments 
reporting no competitive pressure, the estimates show a similar influence of works 
councils on WHP for the various degrees of product market competition. We recognize 
that the number of establishments facing no competitive pressure is relatively small so 
that the coefficient on works council incidence is likely to be imprecisely estimated for 
these establishments. 
 Altogether, our analysis of potentially moderating influences shows a remarkably 
robust relationship between works councils and an increased probability of WHP 
provision for the various types of establishments examined. While the link between 
works councils and WHP is rather general, it appears to be specifically strong for 
establishments with foreign owners, establishments belonging to a multi-establishment 
firm and establishments located in West Germany. 
 
5.3 Detailed WHP Measures 
So far we have used a broad dichotomous variable for the provision of WHP. At issue is 
now whether works councils have an influence on specific WHP measures. Thus, in what 
follows, we analyze the link between works councils and the various WHP measures 
listed in the survey of the IAB Establishment Panel. Table 5 provides the results on our 
key explanatory variable. 
 The estimations show that works councils are associated with various measures 
improving information exchange on health related issues within the establishment. 
Establishments with a works council have a significantly higher likelihood of using 
health circles, sickness absence analysis, and employee surveys on health related 
questions. A works council can ensure that employees’ interests are taken into account 
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when employees and employer share information on health related issues. This increases 
the effectiveness of measures fostering information exchange and, hence, makes their use 
more likely. 
 Moreover the estimations provide evidence that works councils are associated 
with direct measures to promote workplace health. This holds for measures undertaken 
within the establishment. Establishments with a works council have a significantly higher 
likelihood of using in-house activities (e.g, health awareness days, health checks and 
physiotherapy) and providing health-related training and advisory services (e.g., 
addiction issues, regarding mental problems and nutrition issues). It also holds for 
measures undertaken outside the establishment. Establishments with a works council are 
significantly more likely to provide financial support to their employees for health 
promotion activities outside the establishment. This also supports the notion that works 
councils foster the use of WHP measures by ensuring that employees’ interests are taken 
into account and providing information that increases the effectiveness of the measures. 
 Finally, establishments with a works council have a significant higher likelihood 
of using ‘other measures’ and participating in cross-company networks on health 
promotion. Altogether, our regressions suggest that the influence of works councils is not 
confined to a small set of particular WHP measures. Rather, works council appear to 
foster a broad range of various WHP measures. 
 
5.4 The Issue of Endogeneity 
We recognize the possibility that our results might suffer from potential endogeneity of 
the variable for works council incidence. There might be unobserved factors correlated 
with both works council incidence and WHP. These unobserved factors could result in an 
31 
 
omitted variable bias. From a theoretical viewpoint, this bias could result in an 
overestimation or underestimation of the influence of works councils on WHP. If there 
were unobserved factors positively influencing both the incidence of a works council and 
the provision of WHP, the effect of works councils on WHP would be overestimated. For 
example, unobserved poor working conditions may lead employees to implement a works 
council and may induce management to provide WHP. In this case, the estimated 
coefficient on the works council variable would also capture the influence of the 
unobserved working conditions. By contrast, if there were unobserved factors positively 
influencing the incidence of a works council and negatively influencing WHP, the effect 
of works councils on WHP would be underestimated. For example, lazy managers may 
be not able to build trustful relationships with the workforce leading employees to 
implement a works council to protect their interests. These lazy managers may also not 
provide measures to improve workplace health. In that case, the works council variable 
would also capture the influence of the lazy managers. 
In order to examine the possible endogeneity of the works council variable, we 
return to our broad WHP dummy and estimate a recursive bivariate probit model (Greene 
1998, Kassouf and Hoffmann 2006). Let us denote the dummy variable for WHP in 
establishment i by 𝑦1𝑖  and the works council variable by 𝑦2𝑖 : 




               (1) 




               (2) 
where 𝑦1𝑖
∗  and 𝑦2𝑖
∗  are latent variables. These variables are given by:  
   𝑦1𝑖
∗ = 𝛿𝑦2𝑖 + 𝜷1
′ 𝒙1𝑖 + 𝑢1𝑖 ,            (3) 
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   𝑦2𝑖
∗ = 𝜷2
′ 𝒙2𝑖 + 𝑢2𝑖,             (4) 
where 𝛿 is the coefficient on the works council variable, 𝒙1𝑖 and 𝒙2𝑖 are the vectors of the 
other explanatory variables, 𝜷1  and 𝜷2  the corresponding coefficient vectors, and 𝑢1𝑖 
and 𝑢2𝑖 the error terms. 
 In our context, the coefficients in equation (3) are of primary interest. Assuming 
that 𝑢1𝑖 has a standard normal distribution, the traditional univariate probit procedure 
estimates 𝛿 and 𝜷1  by maximum likelihood without taking equation (4) into account. 
Yet, if the works council variable 𝑦2𝑖 and the error term 𝑢1𝑖 are correlated, the estimate of 
𝛿 is biased and inconsistent. Consistent estimates can be obtained by a recursive bivariate 
probit. Equations (3) and (4) form a simultaneous equations model. This simultaneous 
model is called recursive as 𝑦2𝑖 enters equation (3) while 𝑦1𝑖 does not enter equation (4). 
Equation (4) can be considered as a reduced form equation and (3) as a structural 
equation. The bivariate probit assumes that the error terms 𝑢1𝑖 and 𝑢2𝑖 have a bivariate 
normal distribution with E[𝑢1𝑖] = E[𝑢2𝑖] = 0, Var[𝑢1𝑖] = Var[𝑢2𝑖] = 1, and a correlation 
Corr[𝑢1𝑖, 𝑢2𝑖] = 𝜌. Equations (3) and (4) are estimated jointly by using full information 
maximum likelihood. 
In principle, identification of the recursive bivariate probit model is ensured by its 
inherent nonlinearity (Wilde 2000). However, to avoid that identification relies solely on 
the functional form, exclusion restrictions are usually imposed to improve identification. 
Finding convincing exclusion restrictions is always a matter of debate so that attempts to 
account for endogeneity can be largely viewed as exploratory. Here we use the share of 
establishments with works councils calculated for 41 detailed industrial sectors in 16 
federal states. We use the share of establishments with works councils in the year 2009 to 
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instrument works council incidence in the individual establishment in the year 2012. The 
share of establishments with works councils reflects the general propensity within a 
region and narrowly defined industry that works councils are present. Hence, it should 
have a positive influence on the individual establishment’s probability of having a works 
council. 
Researchers have applied similar aggregation identification strategies in other 
contexts. Jirjahn and Mueller (2014) use the works council share within industries to 
instrument works council incidence in productivity regressions. Machin and Wadhwani 
(1991) use the unionization rate within industries to instrument unionization at the 
establishment level. Lee (2004) uses the share of government jobs in a locality to 
instrument public sector employment by workers. Woessmann and West (2006) use 
average class size within schools as an instrument for actual class size. Cornelissen et al. 
(2011) use the share of workers receiving performance pay within industries to 
instrument the individual worker’s chance of receiving performance pay. 
The validity of the instrument requires that the share of establishments with works 
councils in the industry and region has no direct effect on the WHP of the individual 
establishment, but influences WHP only indirectly through the incidence of a works 
council. Of course, one could imagine that the share of establishments with a works 
council might reflect industry-specific working conditions that are also present in the 
individual establishment. This might suggest a direct link between the instrument and the 
individual establishment’s WHP. However, to the extent that our dataset allows to control 
for relevant working conditions at the establishment level, there should be no direct effect 
of the instrument. In the regressions, we control among others for innovations, vintage of 
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technology, shift work, establishment size, blue collar work, part-time, temporary 
contracts, skills, apprenticeship, collective bargaining and type of ownership. Moreover, 
note that our instrument allows us to still include the 12 broadly defined industry 
dummies and the 15 federal state dummies in the regressions. Altogether, our control 
variables should capture important aspects of the working conditions within the 
establishment increasing our confidence in the validity of the instrument. The basic point 
is that the validity of an instrument can depend on the control variables included (Angrist 
and Pischke 2009: chapter 4.5.2). An instrument may be not valid per se, but may be 
valid only after conditioning on covariates. Thus, to the extent that we control for critical 
establishment characteristics, we do not expect a direct effect of the share of 
establishments with a works council. We assume that this share influences WHP only 
indirectly through the incidence of a works council, but not directly and independently of 
the incidence of the works council. 
 Table 6 provides the key results of the recursive bivariate probit regression. The 
determinants of WHP provision are jointly estimated with the determinants of works 
council incidence. The share of establishments with works councils in the industry and 
region is a significant determinant of the individual establishment’s probability of having 
a works council. A Wald test only weakly rejects (at the 10 percent significance level) the 
hypothesis that the incidence of a works council is exogenous. The correlation between 
the error terms of the WHP equation and the works council equation is negative. This 
conforms to the notion that, for example, inefficient managers induce employees to 
implement a works council and do not provide WHP. The negative correlation between 
the error terms implies that the estimated effect of works councils on WHP in the 
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 Altogether, even when taking the potential endogeneity of works council 
incidence into account, the estimates confirm our key finding of a positive influence of 
works councils on WHP. We find only weak evidence of endogeneity of works council 
incidence with respect to WHP. If anything, the evidence suggests that possible 
endogeneity implies that the positive effect of works councils on WHP provision is 
underestimated in the simple probit regressions. 
 
6. Conclusions 
From a theoretical point of view, there exist a series of possible market and 
organizational failures resulting in an underprovision of WHP. Works councils may help 
overcome or at least mitigate these failures resulting in an increased use of WHP within 
establishments. Based on German data from the IAB Establishment Panel, our empirical 
analysis confirms that establishments with a works council have a higher likelihood of 
providing more WHP than required by law. This result also holds when accounting for 
the potential endogeneity of the incidence of a works council. 
Furthermore, our analysis shows that the link between works councils and WHP 
is rather general and holds for various circumstances and types of establishments. 
However, the strength of the link appears to depend on the type of establishment. It is 
particularly strong for establishments located in West Germany, foreign-owned 
establishments, and establishments being part of a multi-establishment firm. Moreover, 
we find that the influence of works councils is not confined to specific measures, but 
rather applies to a broad range of various WHP measures. 
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 Our estimates also suggest that not only works councils, but also union employee 
representation and alternative forms of nonunion representation voluntarily implemented 
by employers have a positive influence on WHP. However, these types of employee 
representation do not appear to be substitutes to works councils. The influences of works 
councils and the other types of employee representation appear to be simply additive. 
 We end this study with recommendations for future research. First, it would be 
interesting to extend our analysis for Germany to other countries. This would be 
particularly interesting as issues of occupational health and safety play an important role 
in works council legislation in many other countries (Jirjahn and Smith 2018b). Second, 
now that the role of works councils in the use of WHP has been examined in detail, it 
would be interesting to analyze whether works councils also have an influence on the 
outcomes of WHP measures. This applies to both the economic performance of 
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Table 1: Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
 
Variable Definition Mean 
Sickness absence analysis Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment uses analysis of sickness 
absence 
0.335 
Employee surveys Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment uses employee surveys 
about health issues at workplace 
0.239 
Health circles Dummy variable equals 1 if there are discussion groups on health 
problems in the establishment 
0.129 
In-house activities Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment provides in-house 
activities (e.g., organization of active breaks, establishment sports 
activities, health awareness days, health checks, physiotherapy) 
0.203 
Health training Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment provides training or 
advisory service for employees (e.g., concerning addiction issues, 
mental problems or nutrition issues) 
0.162 
Financial support Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment provides financial 
support for health promotion activities outside the establishment 
0.097 
Cross-company network Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment participates in a cross-
company network on health promotion (e.g., cooperation with health 
insurance companies) 
0.125 
Other measures Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment uses other measures to 
promote workplace health 
0.085 
  
Workplace health promotion Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment uses of at least one of 
the measures listed above 
0.523 




Table 2: Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
Variable Definition (Mean, Standard Deviation) 
Works council Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment has a works council (0.257, 0.437) 
Other representation Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment has implemented alternative forms of employee 
representation such as staff spokesmen or round tables (0.122, 0.327) 
Collective bargaining Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment is covered by a collective bargaining agreement 
(0.400, 0.490) 
Ln(size) Log of number of employees (3.477, 1.432) 
University degree Share of the workforce with a university degree (0.086, 0.164) 
Skilled employees Share of the workforce with completed apprenticeship training (0.683, 0.265) 
Apprentices Apprentices as a share of the workforce (0.044, 0.078) 
Women Share of the workforce that is female (0.395, 0.293) 
Part-time employees Share of the workforce that is part-time (0.233, 0.257) 
Blue-collar workers Blue-collar workers as a share of the workforce (0.774, 0.219) 
Temporary agency Temporary agency employees as a share of the workforce (0.022, 0.079) 
Weekly hours Usual weekly hours for full-time employees in the establishment excluding overtime hours 
(39.26, 1.804) 
Flextime Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment has flexible working time arrangement for its 
employees (0.373, 0.484) 
Shift work Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment has shift work (0.371, 0.483) 
Sunday work Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment is open for business on Sundays (0.191, 0.393) 
Satisfactory technology Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment uses a satisfactory production technology, zero 
otherwise (0.290, 0.454) 
Modern technology Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment uses a modern production technology, but not the 
latest one (0.493, 0.500) 
Latest technology Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment uses the latest production technology (0.181, 
0.385) 
Innovation Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment launched a product innovation or implemented a 
process innovation in the previous two years (0.523, 0.499) 
Limited liability Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment is a private limited company or stock corporation 
(0.711, 0.453) 
Single-site Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment has no subsidiaries and is not itself a subsidiary 
(0.739, 0.439) 
Foreign owner Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment has a dominant foreign owner (0.076, 0.266) 
Owner-manager Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment is managed by its owner (0.707, 0.455) 
Minor pressure  Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment reports minor competitive pressure (0.119, 0.324) 
Medium pressure Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment reports medium competitive pressure (0.416; 
0.493) 
High pressure Dummy variable equals 1 if the establishment reports high competitive pressure (0.414, 0.492) 
Wage level Total wage bill per employee on June 30
th
 in Euro (2004, 1082) 
Works council share Share of establishments with a works council in the year 2009 calculated for 41 industrial groups 
in 16 federal states (0.260, 0.202). 
Industry dummies 12 industry dummies are included. 
Region dummies 15 federal state dummies are included. 
N = 8215. For the wage variable the number of observations is equal to 6895. The reference groups for the mutually 
exclusive dummy variables are as follows: Establishments with no competitive pressure (with an outdated production 
technology) form the reference group of the competition dummies (technology dummies). 
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Works council 0.331 0.094 0.346 0.099 0.323 0.109 0.308 0.093 
 (6.35)***  (5.86)***  (4.52)***  (5.01)***  
Other representation 0.389 0.111 0.387 0.110 0.367 0.124 0.315 0.095 
 (7.62)***  (6.97)***  (4.74)***  (4.54)***  
Collective bargaining 0.099 0.028 0.077 0.022 0.126 0.043 0.121 0.037 
 (2.64)**  (1.87)*  (2.09)**  (2.27)**  
Ln(size) 0.333 0.095 0.333 0.095 0.254 0.087 0.300 0.091 
 (17.44)***  (15.71)***  (4.17)***  (8.11)***  
University degree 0.004 0.001 -0.149 -0.042 -0.075 -0.025 -0.026 -0.008 
 (0.03)  (0.99)  (0.37)  (0.14)  
Skilled employees -0.027 -0.008 -0.013 -0.004 -0.024 -0.008 0.030 0.009 
 (0.36)  (0.16)  (0.20)  (0.29)  
Apprentices 1.222 0.348 1.615 0.461 2.136 0.721 2.161 0.654 
 (4.91)***  (5.77)***  (4.49)***  (5.03)***  
Women 0.084 0.024 0.077 0.022 0.169 0.057 0.185 0.056 
 (1.07)  (0.87)  (1.28)  (1.54)  
Part-time employees -0.044 -0.013 0.061 0.017 0.099 0.033 0.005 0.001 
 (0.44)  (0.54)  (0.58)  (0.03)  
Blue-collar workers 0.450 0.128 0.389 0.111 0.843 0.285 0.743 0.225 
 (3.64)***  (2.77)***  (3.41)***  (3.25)***  
Temporary agency 0.452 0.129 0.342 0.098 0.635 0.215 0.340 0.103 
 (2.02)**  (1.42)  (1.96)*  (1.16)  
Weekly hours -0.011 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.010 -0.003 -0.015 -0.005 
 (1.13)  (0.47)  (0.61)  (1.03)  
Flextime 0.259 0.074 0.246 0.070 0.268 0.091 0.260 0.079 
 (7.37)***  (6.43)***  (4.83)***  (5.37)***  
Shift work 0.233 0.066 0.208 0.059 0.293 0.099 0.302 0.091 
 (5.49)***  (4.46)***  (4.73)***  (5.48)***  
Sunday work -0.088 -0.025 -0.093 -0.026 -0.258 -0.087 -0.194 -0.059 
 (1.72)*  (1.63)  (3.06)***  (2.73)***  
Satisfactory technology 0.217 0.062 0.210 0.060 0.242 0.082 0.285 0.086 
 (2.32)**  (2.06)**  (1.75)*  (2.26)**  
Modern technology 0.244 0.069 0.243 0.069 0.252 0.085 0.350 0.106 
 (2.64)**  (2.41)**  (1.86)*  (2.82)***  
Latest technology 0.380 0.108 0.366 0.104 0.364 0.123 0.474 0.143 
 (3.89)***  (3.44)***  (2.51)**  (3.59)***  
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Innovation 0.302 0.086 0.317 0.091 0.236 0.080 0.247 0.075 
 (8.95)***  (8.57)***  (4.43)***  (5.18)***  
Limited liability 0.094 0.027 0.070 0.020 0.054 0.018 0.081 0.024 
 (2.15)**  (1.45)  (0.66)  (1.05)  
Single-site -0.136 -0.039 -0.140 -0.040 -0.106 -0.036 -0.114 -0.035 
 (3.07)***  (2.79)***  (1.65)*  (2.09)**  
Foreign owner 0.011 0.003 0.013 0.004 -0.012 -0.004 0.053 0.016 
 (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.61)  
Owner-manager -0.184 -0.052 -0.209 -0.060 -0.132 -0.045 -0.147 -0.044 
 (3.92)***  (3.97)***  (1.95)*  (2.51)**  
Minor pressure -0.059 -0.017 -0.089 -0.025 -0.208 0.070 -0.153 -0.046 
 (0.71)  (0.98)  (1.42)  (1.13)  
Medium pressure -0.067 -0.019 -0.076 -0.022 -0.172 -0.058 -0.132 -0.040 
 (0.89)  (0.92)  (1.30)  (1.08)  
High pressure -0.077 -0.022 -0.098 -0.028 -0.183 -0.062 -0.118 -0.036 
 (1.02)  (1.17)  (1.38)  (0.96)  
Wage level --- --- 0.0001 0.0001     
   (2.58)**      
Industry and region 
dummies 
Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R
2 
0.271 0.270 0.116 0.153 
N 8215 6895 2870 3966 
Dependent variable: Workplace health promotion. Method: Probit. Marginal effects of dummy variables are evaluated for a discrete 
change from 0 to 1. Marginal effects other than dummy variables are evaluated at the mean values. Z-statistics in parentheses are based 




Table 4: Separate Regressions 
 
Split Variable Collective Bargaining 
Explanatory Variable 
No Yes 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 






Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 4931; 0.223 3284; 0.318 
Equality of coefficients 0.38 
Split Variable Other Representation 
Explanatory Variable 
No Yes 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Works council 0.292 0.083 0.588 0.164 
 (5.35)***  (2.98)***  
Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 7214; 0.275 1001; 0.214 
Equality of coefficients 0.15 
Split Variable Single-Site 
Explanatory Variable 
No Yes 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Works council 0.497 0.113 0.209 0.063 
 (5.86)***  (3.09)***  
Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 2146; 0.290 6069; 0.224 
Equality of coefficients 0.008*** 
Split Variable Foreign Owner 
Explanatory Variable 
No Yes 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Works council 0.312 0.091 0.695 0.122 
 (5.68)***  (3.61)***  
Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 7587; 0.257 628; 0.438 
Equality of coefficients 0.06* 
Split Variable Owner-Manager 
Explanatory Variable 
No Yes 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Works council 0.298 0.068 0.339 0.104 
 (3.77)***  (4.74)***  
Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 2407; 0.251 5808; 0.208 
Equality of coefficients 0.70 
Split Variable Shift Work 
Explanatory Variable 
No Yes 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Works council 0.335 0.083 0.344 0.083 
 (4.73)***  (4.16)***  
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Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 5165; 0.193 3050; 0.252 
Equality of coefficients 0.93 
Split Variable Industry 
Explanatory Variable 
Manufacturing Service 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Works council 0.306 0.081 0.343 0.099 
 (3.51)***  (4.73)***  
Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 3112; 0.295 4369; 0.260 
Equality of coefficients 0.74 
Split Variable West Germany / East Germany 
Explanatory Variable 
West Germany East Germany 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Works council 0.394 0.109 0.193 0.057 
 (6.04)***  (2.19)**  
Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 4983; 0.292 3232; 0.249 
Equality of coefficients 0.07* 
Split Variable Product Market Competition 
Explanatory Variable 
No Competition Weak Competition 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 




 Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 420; 0.312 978; 0.260 
Equality of coefficients 0.37 0.84 
 
Some Competition Strong Competition 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 




 Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 3419; 0.270 3397; 0.296 
Equality of coefficients 0.36 0.45 
Dependent variable: Workplace health promotion. Method: Probit. Results on the control variables are suppressed to save 
space. The marginal effects of the works council dummy are evaluated for a discrete change from 0 to 1. Z-statistics for the 
coefficients in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. For the test of equality of coefficients, p-values are shown. 
For the competition variables, each competition regime is tested against the other three regimes. *** Statistically 







Table 5: Measures of Workplace Health Promotion 
 
                Dependent Variables 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Sickness Absence Analysis Employee Surveys 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 






Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 8215; 0.299 8215; 0.135 
 
Health Circles In-House Activities 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Works Council 0.367 0.063 0.277 0.058 
 (6.51)***  (5.35)***  
Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 8215; 0.187 8215; 0.252 
                          Dependent Variables 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Health Training Financial Support 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Works Council 0.237 0.043 0.123 0.018 
 (4.40)***  (2.05)**  
Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 8215; 0.256 8215; 0.172 
                          Dependent Variable 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Cross-Company Network Other Measures 
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Works Council 0.266 0.041 0.109 0.016 
 (4.65)***  (1.73)*  
Number of observations; Pseudo R
2
 8215; 0.262 8215; 0.069 
Method: Probit. Results on the control variables are suppressed to save space. The marginal effects of the works council 
dummy are evaluated for a discrete change from 0 to 1. Z-statistics for the coefficients in parentheses are based on robust 







Table 6: The Issue of Endogeneity 
 















Works council share --- --- 1.377 0.522 
  
 (9.08)***  
N 8215 
Rho -0.127 
𝜒2 (Wald test of exogeneity) 3.098* 
Method: Recursive bivariate probit. Results on the control variables are suppressed to save space. The 
marginal effect of the works council dummy is evaluated for a discrete change from 0 to 1. The marginal 
effect of the instrument is evaluated at the mean value. Z-statistics in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors. Rho is the correlation between the error terms in equations (3) and (4). *** Statistically 






                                                 
1
 Jirjahn (2018) provides evidence that works councils can indeed shape employer attitudes 
toward HRM practices. 
2
 A similar reasoning applies to family friendly work practices (Aghion and Hermalin 1990, 
Heywood and Jirjahn 2009). 
3
 The IAB assures the interviewees of an absolutely anonymous treatment of the data. Thus, 
interviewees have no incentive for strategic answers. 
4
 The full results are available from the authors. 
5
 Substantial increases in the estimated effects are not unusual in studies accounting for 
endogeneity. For example, this phenomenon has been observed in studies on the returns to 
schooling (Card 1995, Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 1999). 
